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Abstract: I argue that conductions are 
a special type of inference indeed, but 
that this does not mean that we need to 
develop novel standards of inference 
goodness or specific argument 
schemes for properly assessing them. 
Following LNMA’s theoretical frame-
work, I provide a semantic account of 
conductions and explain the interesting 
pragmatic properties of a certain type 
of conductions (i.e., balance of consid-
erations or pro-and-con argumenta-
tion) in terms of the rhetorical dimen-
sion of the speech-act of arguing. 
Résumé: Je soutiens que les arguments 
conducteurs sont un type spécial d’in-
férence, mais que cela ne signifie pas 
que nous devons élaborer des nouvelles 
normes de bonne inférence ou de caté-
gorie d’arguments pour les évaluer cor-
rectement. Suivant le cadre théorique 
de la représentation normative linguis-
tique de l’argumentation, je fournis un 
compte rendu sémantique des argu-
ments conducteurs et explique les pro-
priétés pragmatiques intéressantes 
d’un certain type de ces arguments 
(c’est-à-dire l’équilibre des considéra-
tions ou les arguments pour et contre) 
en termes de dimension rhétorique de 
l’acte de parole d’argument. 
 
Keywords: conductions, balance of considerations arguments, pro-and-con argu-
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1. Introduction 
This paper is meant to address three questions: 1) a terminological 
question about the notion of conduction, 2) a logical question about 
the appraisal of conductive inferences, and 3) a pragmatic question 
about the role of a distinctive type of conductive argumentation.  
These three questions have been already addressed in the literature 
on conductions, and very different responses to each of them have 
been defended. The view that I argue for in this paper is that we 
should regard conductions as a special type of inference, even 
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though we do not need to develop novel standards of inference good-
ness or specific argument schemes for assessing them. In fact, I aim 
to show that the pragmatic reconstruction of Toulmin’s model of ar-
gument that underlies the linguistic normative model of argumenta-
tion (LNMA) suffices to appraise conductive inferences, whereas 
the particular features of the most characteristic type of conductive 
argumentation (i.e., the so called pro-and-con or balance of consid-
erations) can be explained in terms of LNMA’s account of the rhe-
torical dimension of argumentation. 
2. The notion of conduction 
In Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics, Carl Wellman 
proposed the term ‘conductive’ for naming a type of argument in 
which “1) a conclusion about some individual case 2) is drawn non-
conclusively 3) from one or more premises about the same case 4) 
without any appeal to other cases.” (Wellman 1971, p. 52). Accord-
ing to this definition, most everyday reasoning and arguing would 
be conductive: “although they expect sacher cake for tea, it’s quite 
difficult to make; let’s bake muffins instead”, “she said she was com-
ing, but it’s rush hour; so, maybe she’s just late”, “this is a party, 
cheer up!”… 
Wellman took conductive arguments to be typical of moral rea-
soning and argumentation, and he pointed at the need of having spe-
cific models for their analysis and appraisal. His goal in Challenge 
and Response was to provide an account of ethical justification, un-
der the assumption that justifying is different from reasoning: the 
latter would be a process with only semantic conditions of correct-
ness, whereas the former would also involve pragmatic conditions, 
determined by the procedural/communicative dimension of the ac-
tivity of giving and asking for reasons. Thus, in Wellman’s project, 
the notion of conduction was meant to capture the standard of infer-
ence that, in his view, is characteristic of the type of justification that 
ethical statements require (Wellman 1971, p. 84). In other words, 
Wellman’s original notion of conduction is the notion of a type of 
inference, on a par with others such as deductions and inductions. 
Specifically, Wellman said that conductions are a type of 
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“nondemonstrative nonformal inference to a particular conclusion” 
(Wellman 1971, p. 52). 
It is easy to guess that the view that there is a type of inference 
that provides support for its conclusion in a nondemonstrative and 
nonformal way was perceived as support for the incipient endeavour 
of developing an informal logical approach to argument appraisal. 
In the late 1970s, Trudy Govier, for one, took Wellman’s notion of 
conduction as one of the touchstones of her own informal logical 
project.  She proposed a different definition of conductions, ques-
tioning both the view that conductions are only about particular 
cases, and the claim that they are typical of moral reasoning (Govier 
1979, p. 12). Thus, in her latest paper on the topic, Govier character-
ized conductions as “arguments in which premises are put forward 
as separately and non-conclusively relevant to support a conclusion, 
against which negatively relevant considerations may also be 
acknowledged” (Govier 2011, p. 262). 
Govier was not alone in paying attention to, and also questioning, 
Wellman’s definition of conductions. Following her, Hitchcock 
(1981, 1994), Freeman (2011) and Blair (2011a), among others, 
have also resisted the first and the third features of conductions in 
Wellman’s definition: why should conductions be only about indi-
vidual cases? Importantly, however, as Blair noticed, if we drop 
these features from Wellman’s definition, “then conductive reason-
ing or argument becomes any defeasible reasoning or argument that 
does not rely on analogy” (Blair 2011a, p. 3). And the problem is: 
does this make a sound category? What is special about being a non-
analogical defeasible inference? 
In fact, the flourishing of informal logic and, specially, the dis-
credit of formal logic as the hegemonic model for inference ap-
praisal, made many theorists consider that there was nothing special 
about inferences that are neither deductive (that is, whose conclu-
sions follow of necessity from the premises) nor inductive (in the 
sense of ‘probabilistic’). This is why Blair pointed at the need of 
distinguishing conductive inferences from “other categories of infer-
ence discussed in the literature that share these two features, such as 
those called ‘presumptive,’ ‘plausible,’ ‘prima facie,’ ‘pro tanto,’ 
‘provisoed’ or ‘defeasible’” (Blair 2011b, p. 4).  
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Actually, Wellman had further developed his characterization of 
conductions by distinguishing three subtypes: 1) conductions in 
which a single relevant but non-conclusive reason is offered in sup-
port of a conclusion, 2) conductions in which several relevant con-
siderations are jointly adduced for a conclusion, and 3) conductions 
in which both pro and counter-considerations are put forward to 
draw a conclusion.  
After Wellman, other scholars have also considered that appeal-
ing to features other than the type of inferential support that the 
premises provide to the conclusion might be a sound strategy to dif-
ferentiate conductions from other types of reasonings and argu-
ments. Thus, for example, Hitchcock (2013) proposed that: 
What distinguishes conductive reasoning and argument from argu-
ments from sign and arguments from complex properties to their 
simple constituents is that the conclusion of conductive reasoning or 
argument attributes a supervenient status to the subject of interest, 
on the basis of factors that the reasoner takes to count for or against 
its having that status. Thus, we can define conductive reasonings and 
arguments as those in which a supervenient status is attributed to a 
subject of interest on the basis of one or more features of that sub-
ject, with possible acknowledgement of features that count against 
the attribution. The subject may be a class rather than a first-order 
entity, and it may be an ordered n-tuple (pair, triple, etc.) rather than 
an individual. The supervenient status will typically be evaluative, 
prescriptive, interpretive or classificatory (Hitchcock 2013, p. 205). 
Importantly, as Hitchcock himself underlined: “such reasoning can 
be deductively valid, in the broad sense that the meaning of its con-
stituents rules out the possibility of true premises and a false conclu-
sion” (Hitchcock 2013, p. 205). In other words, this strategy might 
leave out the condition that conductions are non-conclusive infer-
ences, which, for Wellman and Govier was key. So, the question is, 
who is right? What is a conduction? 
The word ‘conduction’ was introduced as a technical term, aimed 
at naming a theoretical distinction. The fact that we didn’t have a 
previous, ordinary, notion of conduction (or in other words, a prac-
tice of naming “conductions” certain types of inferences) has re-
sulted in the following quandary: if two proposed definitions of con-
duction differ from one another, how are we to settle which, if either, 
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is the right one? How should we understand, for example, the dispute 
on whether or not conductions are about specific cases, or whether 
or not they are non-conclusive? Unfortunately, we cannot appeal to 
the alleged extension of the term, because the term itself was born 
with the very theoretical distinction. Thus, we cannot consider par-
ticular examples of alleged conductions in order to define the notion 
of conduction because the very selection of examples would beg the 
question in favour of our preferred definition. 
In fact, since there is no pre-existing notion of conduction that our 
definitions should honour, we cannot have a criterion to determine 
the accuracy of our definitions of conduction. All that we have is the 
set of actual inferences and the aim of distinguishing among them 
by setting the corresponding categories for one theoretical purpose 
or another. In these circumstances, it seems reasonable to adopt a 
pragmatic perspective in order to distinguish between better and 
worse definitions of conduction. 
Now, by coining the term ‘conduction’, Wellman suggested the 
need of dealing with a phenomenon that, allegedly, traditional logic 
had overlooked despite its significance for the field—namely, a type 
of inference that is neither deductive, nor inductive.1 Let me then 
adopt the following pragmatic criterion in order to distinguish be-
tween better and worse definitions of conductions: the “best” defini-
tion of conduction is the one that makes the notion more relevant for 
the field. For sure, being an inference about horses is being a type of 
inference, but setting this category doesn’t seem very relevant from 
a logical perspective. 
By contrast, I think that Wellman’s first intuition—namely, that 
there is a type of inference that traditional models of inference good-
ness did overlook—is important enough for our field. For such a type 
of inference would show that inferential normativity is not a formal 
matter, and this has been the main intuition leading the development 
                                                        
1 By “deductive”, I mean an inference whose conclusion is meant to follow nec-
essarily from the premises. Sometimes “inductive” is used to name inferences 
whose conclusions aren’t meant to follow necessarily from the premises—i.e., in-
ferences that are not deductive. Obviously, this cannot be the meaning of “induc-
tive” here, because in that sense, any inference would be either deductive or in-
ductive. Here, “inductive” stands for “inference whose conclusion is meant to fol-
low with a certain degree of probability”. 
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of informal logic since Toulmin’s work (Toulmin, 1958). Moreover, 
in defining conductions simply as inferences that are neither deduc-
tive nor inductive, the catalogue of types of inferences turns out to 
be (trivially) complete: necessarily, it would consist of just deduc-
tions, inductions and conductions. In the following sections, I aim to 
show, on the other hand, that the notion of conduction so understood 
is not a mere catchall, but the cornerstone of the project of providing 
a general normative theory of inference—that is, for logic ever since 
Aristotle. 
3. Conductive inferences, conductive arguments, conductive 
reasoning and conductive argumentation 
Within argumentation theory, arguments are commonly character-
ized as ‘the product of argumentation’. However, if this characteri-
zation were offered as a definition of argument, it would be too 
vague to be adequate. If we agree that argumentation is a communi-
cative activity, then we can think of its “product” in many different 
ways: as particular pieces of speech or text, as the meaning conveyed 
by them, as their effects on addressees, etc… 
Within the framework of formal logic, an argument is usually de-
fined as a set of propositions, one of which—the conclusion- follows 
from the others—the premises. But the problem with such a defini-
tion is: if the premises of an argument do not follow from the con-
clusion, isn’t such a set of propositions just a set of propositions?  
Obviously, this problem affects not only the characterization of con-
ductions, but also of inductions and deductions. For, as Fohr (1979, 
p. 5) had observed, the common usage of ‘argument’—and the very 
business of appraising arguments—requires that there can be bad in-
stances of it. 
In facing the difficulties of defining deductions, inductions and 
conductions in terms of the support that the premises provide to the 
conclusion, Govier (1980) and Hitchcock (1980) suggested that 
these are not types of inferences but types of validity or types of 
standards of appraisal. Yet, this was not the moral that Fohr himself 
drew from his observation. Instead, his suggestion was to refrain 
from thinking of arguments as things that exist in vacuo, but as being 
person-related (Fohr 1979, p. 5). 
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In Bermejo-Luque (2011), I proposed a linguistic normative 
model of argumentation (LNMA) that, in a way, captures Fohr’s in-
tuition that the best option for avoiding such problems is to adopt a 
pragmatic linguistic perspective and to give up Platonism altogether. 
LNMA follows Bach and Harnish’s (1979) Speech-act Schema in 
order to characterize the second order speech-act complex of argu-
ing; that is, as a speech-act composed of a speech-act of adducing 
(the reason or set of reasons) and a speech-act of concluding (the 
conclusion or target-claim). The illocution of arguing, so under-
stood, counts as an attempt at showing a target-claim to be correct. 
Correspondingly, in LNMA argumentation goodness is character-
ized as a matter of both semantic conditions determining the correct-
ness of target-claims and pragmatic conditions determining how 
well an act of arguing plays as an act of showing. In this model, ar-
guments are mere representations of the particular inferences that 
supervene on acts of arguing and also on acts of reasoning (i.e., par-
ticular inferential processes that are the mental counterparts of acts 
of arguing). 
In contrast with acts of arguing and acts of reasoning, which are, 
so to speak, ‘objects’ of the world, arguments would be mere theo-
retical constructions, not abstract objects from a Platonic world. 
From this perspective, we would not “use” arguments, but “produce” 
arguments to represent the inferences that we make. As such repre-
sentations, arguments can be obtained by displaying a variety of 
models, such as those of the different formal systems or informal 
argumentative schemas.2 In thinking of conductions as a type of 
                                                        
2 Hitchcock dismisses this strategy: “But, as has been argued in the case of at-
tempts to classify reasoning and argument as deductive or inductive, such appeals 
to the intentions or claims or beliefs of reasoners and arguers are vacuous in many 
cases and are unnecessary for argument appraisal (…). As one can confirm for 
oneself by immediate retrospection, reasoners who draw a conclusion for them-
selves from information at their disposal are typically unaware of whether they are 
drawing it conclusively or non-conclusively. Reasoners just draw their conclu-
sions, and it is only after that inferential act, if at all, that they determine whether 
their conclusion follows conclusively or non-conclusively. As for arguers, they 
sometimes claim a qualitative degree of support for their conclusion by qualifying 
it with terms like ‘must’ or ‘probably’ or ‘presumably’ or ‘may.’ But they do so 
in a minority of cases. If we cannot discover an arguer's intentions in this respect, 
we must construe the argument as ambiguous and test it against both deductive 
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inference, we are assuming that conductive arguments are mere rep-
resentations of conductive acts of reasoning or conductive acts of 
arguing, and also that conductive argumentation is argumentation 
that involves conductive acts of arguing. Let us then see what is a 
conductive act of arguing. 
4. The linguistic normative model of argumentation 
As already pointed out, one of the goals of this paper is to provide a 
model for the analysis and appraisal of conductions. I will do so 
within LNMA. So, let me first summarize the main features of this 
theoretical framework. 
LNMA follows Toulmin’s intuition that modal qualifiers are key 
to the semantic appraisal of argumentation—that is, the appraisal of 
argumentation’s semantic conditions, which determine the correct-
ness of a target-claim. Yet, in contrast with Toulmin’s model of ar-
gument (1958, chapter 3), LNMA’s model of argument incorporates 
two types of modals: ontological and epistemic. 
In everyday discourse, we can make explicit the variety of ways 
in which we can put forward a certain semantic content p in a first-
order constative speech-act by saying, for example “p is true,” “p is 
(more or less) probable,” “p is (more or less) acceptable,” “p is 
(more or less) verisimilar,” “p is plausible,” “p is necessary,” “p is 
possible,” etc. These ontological modals are terms that make explicit 
the type and degree of pragmatic force of the constatives comprising 
an act of arguing. They are ontological because they are meant to 
express the value of our propositions as representations of the actual 
state of the world. When we put forward a propositional content with 
the appropriate pragmatic force given the actual state of the world, 
we make first-order constatives that are semantically correct—like 
the correct assertions “(it is true that) snow is white”, “(it is 
                                                        
and inductive (and conductive) standards.” (Hitchcock 2013, p. 200) Con-
trastingly, within LNMA’s theoretical framework, whether we are conscious of it 
or not, we always put forward conclusions with a certain degree of epistemic force, 
because this force is what turns a mere act of claiming that A into an act of con-
cluding that A: this force is essential to any speech-act of concluding as a specific 
type of constative speech-act. Thus, interpreting a speaker as having drawn a con-
clusion requires being in a position to determine the specific epistemic modal that 
she is supposed to be using for so concluding. 
Appraisal of Conductions  131 
© Lilian Bermejo-Luque Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2019), pp. 123-145 
necessary that) a bachelor is an unmarried man”, “(it is possible that) 
there is life in other planets”, etc. Contrastingly, the modal that ex-
presses the pragmatic force with which we draw a conclusion is an 
epistemic modal. This modal is meant to communicate what we take 
to be our credentials for concluding, i.e. the type and degree of sup-
port that our reasons are supposed to confer on our target-claims be-
cause of our inference-claims. For example, in saying that a claim 
holds truly, necessarily, possibly, plausibly, (more or less) probably, 
etc. (i.e. in saying things such as “certainly p,” “necessarily p,” “it 
might be the case that p,” “plausibly p,” “(more or less) probably p,” 
etc.), we are expressing something about the status of this claim as 
knowledge, about the confidence that we may place on it. Thus, any 
second-order speech-act of concluding involves, either explicitly or 
implicitly, not only the ontological modal of the first-order consta-
tive that it is built on, but also the epistemic modal that indicates the 
force with which this first-order claim is concluded. 
As representations of the inferences that supervene on acts of ar-
guing and acts of reasoning, arguments in LNMA consist of the fol-
lowing elements: premises (corresponding either to the speech-act 
of adducing a reason, R, or to the cognitive input in the act of rea-
soning, CI), conclusion (corresponding either to the speech-act of 
concluding a target-claim, C, or to the cognitive output in the act of 
reasoning, CO), warrant (corresponding either to the inference-
claim in the act of arguing, IC, or to its counterpart in the act of rea-
soning; i.e., the inference-motivation, IM) and the representations of 
the epistemic and ontological modals, em and om, of each of the 
speech-acts making up the act of arguing (corresponding to the type 
and degree of constative pragmatic force with which the speaker, 
either implicitly or explicitly, puts forward the propositional content 
of each constative) or of the judgments and beliefs constituting the 
act of reasoning (corresponding to the type and degree of assent to 
each propositional content constituting the act of reasoning). Thus, 
an ascription of both epistemic and ontological modals (ultimately, 
the ascription made by the arguer or the reasoner—which, in case 
she doesn’t make them explicit, is something that we’ll have to infer 
from the context) is part of the layout of arguments, and the semantic 
appraisal of an act of arguing or reasoning results in the process of 
determining the right ascription of modals to each represented claim 
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or judgement/belief (i.e., the process of ascertaining whether or not 
the ascription made by the arguer or the reasoner is correct after all). 
This model of argument can then be outlined as follows: 
 
(omr/ci)Premise _________therefore___ (emx)(omc/co) Conclusion 
| 
since 
(omic/im)Warrant: “if R/CI, then C/CO” 
 
(The contents of the antecedent and the consequent of the warrant 
correspond to the whole first-order constatives R and C of the act of 
arguing, i.e., to their propositional contents in conjunction with their 
(implicit or explicit) ontological modals, or to the whole cognitive 
input and output, CI and CO of the act of reasoning, i.e., to their 
propositional contents and their corresponding type and degree of 
assent). 
 
Let  represent the idiomatic function that, for each ontological 
modal of a conditional, assigns the epistemic modal needed to draw 
a conclusion having this conditional as its warrant—or, in other 
words, the term that is used in a certain language for expressing ei-
ther the pragmatic force of any speech-act of concluding having a 
conditional so qualified as its inference-claim or the type and degree 
of assent to the cognitive output having a conditional so qualified as 
its inference-motivation. 
 
(omi) = emi 
 
In this account, an argument is valid (i.e., the inference is good, 
whatever its type) iff emi  = emx and omi is correct—that is, if it is 
the ontological modal that actually corresponds to the inference-
claim as a constative or to the inference-motivation as a belief or 
judgement, given the actual state of the world. In other words, an 
argument is valid if and only if the epistemic modal that the speaker 
(or reasoner) has used for concluding or coming to believe the cog-
nitive output is the epistemic modal that  assigns to the ontological 
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modal of the speaker’s implicit inference-claim or inference-moti-
vation, and this ontological modal is appropriate for this inference 
claim or inference motivation given the actual state of the world. 
5. Deductions, inductions and conductions in LNMA 
In LNMA, deductive arguments are arguments representing acts of 
arguing or acts of reasoning whose inference-claims/inference-mo-
tivations are meant to be necessary truths (like “if this is red, then it 
is coloured”). We know that an inference-claim or inference-moti-
vation is meant to be necessary because the conclusion was drawn 
with such epistemic pragmatic force. In case this conditional is a 
necessary truth indeed, the argument will be valid, and the arguer 
will be entitled to epistemically qualify the conclusion with a “nec-
essarily”. For example, pieces of argumentation such as “She is in 
the garden or in the living-room, and she is not in the garden; so, 
necessarily she is in the living-room” or “This may be red; so, nec-
essarily, it may be coloured” are deductive and valid because their 
corresponding inference-claims are the necessary truths “if (it is true 
that) she is in the garden or in the living-room, and (it is true that) 
she is not in the garden, then (it is true that) she is in the living-room” 
and “If (it is possible that) this is red, then (it is possible that) it is 
coloured”. Likewise, valid probabilistic arguments will be those rep-
resenting acts of arguing, or acts of reasoning whose inference-
claims/inference-motivations are meant to be (more or less) proba-
ble, so that they entitle us to epistemically qualify their conclusions 
with a “(more or less) probably/likely”. For example, “Our currency 
is losing value; so, very probably, the inflation rate will rise” has as 
its inference-claim “if (it is true that) our currency is losing value, 
then (it is true that) the inflation rate will rise”, which is very proba-
ble indeed (thus making the argumentation inductively valid).  
Importantly, in LNMA, validity is not co-extensive with deduc-
tiveness: “deductive,” “inductive,” “conductive” are names for in-
ferences, in the sense of forms of inferring, and any of them may be 
wrong. That is, an inference may be invalid and still be, for example, 
a deductive inference, because in LNMA, being an inference is a 
pragmatic property instead of a syntactic or semantic one. 
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In turn, argumentation like “You ought to help him for he has 
been very kind to you” (Wellman 1971, p. 55) or “You ought to take 
your son to the movie because you promised to do so, it is a good 
movie, and you have nothing better to do this afternoon” (Wellman 
1971, p. 56)”, would be represented by means of arguments whose 
warrants are conditionals that are plausible or just plainly true, such 
as “if (it is true that) he has been very kind to you, then (it is true 
that) you ought to help him” and “if (it is true that) you promised 
taking your soon to the movie, it is a good movie, and you have 
nothing better to do this afternoon, then (it is plausible that) you 
ought to take your son to the movie.” 
Now, if we adopt the suggested definition of conductions in sec-
tion 3, deductions, inductions and conductions would constitute the 
full catalogue of types of inferential support. And if we adopt 
LNMA’s model of argument to assess inferences, we can character-
ize deductive arguments as those having as their warrants condition-
als qualified as necessary truths. In turn, inductive (probabilistic) ar-
guments would be arguments having as their warrants conditionals 
qualified as (more or less) probable, and finally, conductive argu-
ments would be arguments whose warrants are conditionals quali-
fied by ontological modals other than “necessary” or “probable”. 
This account of conductions enables us to characterize another 
interesting feature of this type of inference, namely, that it may ex-
hibit different degrees of strength—just as (probabilistic) inductions 
do. For example, a piece of argumentation like “although there is a 
traffic jam in Sunset Boulevard, we won’t be late because we are 
going to take a short-cut by River Side that avoids Sunset” would be 
stronger than “although there is a traffic jam in Sunset Boulevard, 
we won’t be late because we are going to take a short-cut after cross-
ing Sunset Boulevard.” Why? Because, provided that there is a traf-
fic jam in Sunset Boulevard, the conditional “if we take a short-cut 
by River Side that avoids Sunset, then we won’t be late” is more 
plausible than “if we take a short-cut after crossing Sunset, then we 
won’t be late”. 
Alternatively, we can adopt Hitchcock’s view (1980), and distin-
guish only two types of arguments: deductive (where the conclusion 
cannot be false if the premises are true) and inductive (where the 
conclusion can be false even if the premises are true); that would 
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make of conductions a type of induction.  Finally, LNMA allows us 
to just drop this terminology and build a full typology of inferential 
support by considering the range of ontological modals that can be 
used to qualify an inference-claim/inference-motivation. If we do so, 
we shall distinguish between inferences having as their warrants 
conditionals that are meant to be necessary or probabilistically true, 
plausible, possible, true, or even a presumption, etc.3 Which cata-
logue of inferences is better is a practical question that exceeds the 
goals of this paper. 
6. The semantic appraisal of conductions in LNMA 
As already pointed out, Wellman developed his characterization of 
conductions by distinguishing three subtypes: 1) conductions in 
which a single relevant but non-conclusive reason is offered in sup-
port of a conclusion, 2) conductions in which several relevant con-
siderations are jointly adduced for a conclusion, and 3) conductions 
in which both pro and counter-considerations are put forward to 
draw a conclusion. 
In view of the elusiveness of characterizing conductions in gen-
eral, argumentation theorists have traditionally focused on the last, 
more characteristic subtype of Wellman’s typology, also dubbed 
“balance-of-considerations arguments” or “pro and con arguments”. 
Actually, as Freeman (2011, p. 127) has pointed out, “since the third 
pattern clearly includes the second, and the second the first, we [can] 
take it as paradigm for the class of conductive arguments.” For this 
reason, any account that is able to properly deal with the analysis 
and appraisal of this third type of conductions should be a good 
model for the evaluation of conductions in general. 
Now, in order to provide this account within LNMA’s frame-
work, we have to provide a speech-act account of ‘pro’ and ‘con’ 
considerations. As pointed out in section 3, according to LNMA, 
conductions are types of inferences, and conductive argumentation 
is argumentation that involves this type of inference. But, of course, 
any piece of argumentation may involve more than one inference. 
                                                        
3 See Bermejo-Luque (2016) for an account of presumptive inferences in LNMA, 
and also Bermejo-Luque (2012) for a similar account of both deductive and non-
deductive analogical inferences. 
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Particularly, as regards “pro and con” argumentation, our claim is 
that pro-considerations are speech-acts of adducing that belong to 
acts of arguing, whereas con-considerations are a different type of 
speech-act that is external to the complex speech-act of arguing. Let 
us see why. 
Wellman’s examples suggest that counter-considerations are 
claims introduced by means of expressions like ‘although’, ‘even 
though’, ‘in spite of’, etc. Scholars such as Walton (2011) or van 
Laar (2014) have dealt with the appraisal of conductions by casting 
counter-considerations as moves in a dialogue. Yet, as Govier 
(2011) has pointed out:  
The “dialogue” construction may lapse into adversariality if we con-
strue the pros as against the cons, and one dialogue participant as 
arguing against the other. Something has been added in this inter-
pretation, namely the element of adversariality suggested by 
‘against.’ And something has been lost, namely the incorporation of 
both positively and negatively relevant factors into a single view. It 
is this element of balance, of fairness, of recognition that there are 
alternate views on behalf of which reasonable points can be made, 
that has for many been an especially important and intriguing aspect 
of pro and con conductive arguments (Govier 2011, p. 269). 
As Adler (2013) reminded us, within the Gricean pragmatic tra-
dition, terms like ‘although’, ‘even though’, ‘in spite of’, etc. result 
in conventional implicatures. As Bach (1999, p. 31) puts it, by means 
of conventional implicatures, speakers would conventionally impli-
cate propositions whose truth-values do not affect the truth-value of 
the entire utterance, so that their eventual falsity would be compati-
ble with the truth of the entire utterance. On this view, the truth-
conditions of A and B would be the same. 
 
A) Although your lawn needs cutting, you ought to take your son 
to the movies  
 
B) Your lawn needs cutting and you ought to take your son to the 
movies  
 
In “The myth of conventional implicature”, Bach (1999, p. 18) 
suggested that terms such as ‘although’ are utterance modifiers, that 
is expressions that serve to make second-order speech-acts. Bach 
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does not develop further this notion, but he dubbed speech-acts in-
troduced by means of expressions such as ‘although’ concessives. If 
we follow Bach’s proposal and LNMA’s account of the speech-act 
of arguing, we will have that an utterance of “although your lawn 
needs cutting, you ought to take your son to the movies because the 
picture is ideal for children and will be gone by tomorrow” consists 
of two speech-acts: the concessive speech-act of uttering “your lawn 
needs cutting”, and the argumentative speech-act of uttering “you 
ought to take your son to the movies since the picture is ideal for 
children and will be gone by tomorrow”. 
As we have seen, in LNMA, the semantic appraisal of an act of 
arguing requires determining which is the proposition adduced, 
which is the proposition concluded, and what is the constative force 
of the corresponding speech-acts. The following argument would 
represent the above speech-act of arguing. 
 
Premise (representing the act of adducing, with its ontological 
modal): (it is true that) the picture is ideal for children and (it 
is true that) it will be gone by tomorrow 
 
Conclusion (representing the act of concluding, with its ontolog-
ical and epistemic modals): (plausibly) (it is true that) you 
should take your son to the movies 
 
Warrant (representing the inference-claim, with its ontological 
modal): (it is plausible that) if it is true that the picture is ideal 
for children and it is true that it will be gone by tomorrow, then 
it is true that you should take your son to the movies 
 
As we have seen, this argument will be valid iff it is plausible that 
if it is true that the picture is ideal for children and it is true that it 
will be gone by tomorrow, then it is true that you should take your 
son to the movies, and the target-claim will be semantically correct 
iff the argument is valid and its premises are semantically correct 
too—that is, if it is true that the picture is ideal for children and it is 
true that it will be gone by tomorrow. 
Importantly, in order to determine the plausibility of this condi-
tional, additional information, such as that your lawn needs cutting, 
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will of course be relevant—even if the arguer or the opponent had 
never pointed at it! Actually, further information may also be needed 
in order to determine the plausibility of the warrant, which is one of 
the main tasks to determine the semantic correctness of the inference 
in LNMA. At any rate, the need for actual information about the case 
is something that no assessment of the argumentation can escape. 
Now, this kind of analysis might seem similar to the one that 
Freeman (2011) proposes in “Evaluating conductive arguments in 
light of the Toulmin model”, since he also adopts Toulmin’s model 
to appraise conductions, and because of that, he considers that the 
ground adequacy of this type of argument is, in the end, a matter of 
“the reliability of the properly and comprehensively framed warrant 
of the argument, framed with respect to conceded rebuttals, includ-
ing unanticipated rebuttals, and counter-rebuttals” (Freeman 2011, 
p. 144). Yet, there are a few significant differences between Free-
man’s proposal and mine: 
Firstly, for Freeman, warrants are general rules (or covering gen-
eralizations, as Hitchcock [1985] suggested), whereas in LNMA 
warrants are the specific conditional that has as its antecedent that 
which the speaker has adduced and as its consequent, that which the 
speaker has concluded. I have argued for this notion of warrants in 
Bermejo-Luque (2004, pp. 174-176). 
Secondly, for Freeman, counter-considerations are part of the 
warrant that is meant to sanction the inference from the data to the 
conclusion, whereas in our LNMA account, counter-considerations 
remain as an independent part of the argumentation, for they would 
play no properly inferential role: they just constitute additional in-
formation that might help (or not) to determine the value of the con-
ditional. 
I think that these two differences speak in favour of LNMA’s ac-
count. For, as Allen (2011) has pointed out, assessing conductions 
“requires judges to remain rooted in the particularities of the case at 
hand” (Allen 2011, p. 189), rather than relying on covering general-
izations. Actually, the very idea that there might be covering gener-
alizations available for each occasion in which a conductive infer-
ence would be in order, and that these rules vary as they include dif-
ferent counter considerations, seems counterintuitive. 
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As Freeman himself recognizes, “some may wonder whether we 
are being too prodigal in the number of warrants we admit.” His own 
response to this criticism bites the bullet: “If one allow these many 
arguments, one should not cavil at allowing their inference rules” 
(Freeman 2011, p. 131). But, why should we allow such ontological 
implosion? 
In our proposed account, counter-considerations are not part of 
the warrant because they are not part of what is adduced in support 
of the conclusion. Of course, the ontological value of the conditional 
depends on whether or not, overall, counter-considerations don’t 
overwhelm pro-considerations, but this is something that the evalu-
ator has to assess independently of the particular counter-considera-
tions that the arguer has decided to make explicit. In contrast with 
Freeman’s account, LNMA favours ontological parsimony not only 
by refusing the need of appealing to inference rules, but also by con-
sidering that the following arguments have the same warrant: 
 
a) Although the meeting was scheduled in room 1.1, we’ll have 
to go to the computer room because Wanda will attend by 
Skype 
 
b) Although the meeting was scheduled in room 1.2, we’ll have 
to go to the computer room because Wanda will attend by 
Skype 
 
c) Although the meeting was scheduled in room 1.3, we’ll have 




7. The rhetorical aspect of conductive argumentation 
There is a third, more important difference between Freeman’s ac-
count and mine, and it has to do with the fact that LNMA allows for 
an integrated account of the specific rhetorical properties of pro-and-
con conductive argumentation. 
Appraisal of Conductions  140 
© Lilian Bermejo-Luque Informal Logic, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2019), pp. 123-145 
As Xie (2017) has suggested, in this type of conduction, “counter-
considerations are simply mentioned in a non-refutational way, in 
which no attempt is made to scrutinize them or to remove them.” 
According to Xie, counter-considerations are merely rhetorical de-
vices with no bearing on the logical strength of the argument. 
As may be apparent by now, I partly agree with this view: as con-
cessions, counter-considerations play no real inferential role. Yet, 
they point at clues for assessing the corresponding conditional. 
On the other hand, Xie contends that the best way to deal with 
counter-considerations as rhetorical devices is by means of the 
pragma-dialectical notion of strategic maneuvering (van Eemeren 
2010); and at this point, our views also differ. In Xie’s account, the 
persuasive power of conductions has to do with the fact that when 
an arguer mentions the points that count against her own views, she 
somehow conveys to the audience an impression of honesty, objec-
tivity and open-mindedness that contributes to boosting her own 
credibility.  
Presenting counter-considerations in such a delicate way would im-
pose to the audience an assumption of some outweighing-relation 
between the reasons for the conclusion and the counter-considera-
tions against it, and thereby leaves to them an impression that the 
arguer has had some good reason to believe the conclusion is cer-
tainly defensible against those counter-considerations. Then the au-
dience would be oriented to recognize the counter-considerations as 
weaker, wrong or no longer viable, and to believe that their im-
portance has already been eliminated somewhere else for some pos-
sible reasons, even though the arguer has provided nothing to actu-
ally account for these judgements. Consequently, the audience’s 
own attitude towards the conclusion may be changed, and they 
might become more apt to accept it, especially when they don’t re-
ally have a good grasp of the justificatory power in those counter-
considerations (Xie 2017, p. 12-13). 
But, do conductions necessarily involve an audience or addressee 
to be persuaded? Consider, for example, a person deliberating on 
whether or not to respond to an insult. She is trying to make up her 
mind, and she comes to reason that even though it’d be perfectly 
right to respond, she’d better keep silent, since everyone is slave of 
her own words and master of her own silence. Wouldn’t it be a bit 
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forced to say of someone reasoning this way that she is trying to 
better achieve effectiveness in persuading… herself? I think that 
there is something very strange in explaining the particulars of her 
reasoning by appealing to the idea of strategic maneuvering. For, 
even if we agreed that any type of argumentation might be recon-
structed as a critical discussion—including argumentation put for-
ward for oneself—it is not evident that we can make sense of an 
argumentative move as a strategic maneuver in absence of a real op-
ponent to be persuaded. Instead, when someone concedes to herself 
that it’d be perfectly right to respond and then says to herself that 
she’d better keep silent, since everyone is slave of her own words 
and master of her own silence, what she is considering is an out-
weighing-relation between having a right to do X vs. X being the 
best thing to do in the circumstances. Someone reasoning this way 
is not being strategic to herself; rather, she is drawing a conclusion 
from the pro-consideration in spite of the con-consideration. 
According to the analysis proposed so far, in pro-and-con con-
ductions, there is indeed an appeal to an outweighing-relation that is 
meant to restore the plausibility of the warrant. The goodness of a 
conduction of this type is a matter of whether or not there exists such 
an outweighing-relation after all, since, otherwise, the conditional 
having as its antecedent the pro-consideration and as its consequent 
the conclusion, will not be true or plausible. Taking Xie’s example, 
in “Even though I didn’t do well in the final exam, you should still 
consider letting me pass this course, because I really worked hard on 
this course for the whole semester, and did learn something in this 
course”, the warrant is “if (it is true that) I really worked hard on this 
course for the whole semester and (it is true that) I did learn some-
thing in this course, then (it is true that) you should consider letting 
me pass this course”. The plausibility of this conditional depends on 
whether or not, in the circumstances, the fact that the student worked 
hard and learnt something makes it plausible that the instructor 
should consider letting him pass. Is it the case? If it is, then the ar-
gument is valid. If it is not, then the argument is not. 
Our speech-act account of pro-and-con conductions is in a posi-
tion to explain the rhetorical impact of counter-considerations: in ef-
fect, by making a concession, the speaker may convey an image of 
reasonableness that might increase her persuasiveness. But this does 
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not mean that counter-considerations are mere strategic devices: by 
conceding a counter-consideration, the arguer may also be giving 
clues that point in the direction of showing that her inference-claim 
is not plausible. But, in the last resort, that will finally depend on 
whether or not there is indeed such an outweighing-relation between 
the pros and the cons. 
8. Conclusions 
My goals in this paper were: 1) to show that it makes sense to settle 
a category of inferences—namely, conductions—that are neither de-
ductive nor inductive (probabilistic), 2) to explain what all types of 
conductions have in common and 3) to provide a model to appraise 
conductive inferences and conductive argumentation—also from a 
rhetorical perspective. I have argued that the pragmatic setting of 
LNMA makes it possible to characterize conductions as types of in-
ferences indeed, not as types of standards of inference appraisal. 
LNMA also provides a rationale to explain what is characteristic 
of all types of conductions and to further distinguish different types 
of inferences that are neither deductive nor inductive, like presump-
tive inferences and plausible inferences. In this respect, LNMA af-
fords tidiness to our catalogue of types of inferences in terms of the 
variety of ontological modals that can be used to put forward a con-
ditional in a constative speech-act. LNMA explains what does it 
mean to say that a reason is relevant to a conclusion in terms of the 
goodness of the corresponding inference-claim or inference-motiva-
tion. And, as pointed out, this account also explains why conductions 
may lend more or less support to their conclusions. 
Finally, I have shown that LNMA’s speech-act account of argu-
mentation is in a position to deal not only with the semantic appraisal 
of conductions, but also with the characteristic rhetorical properties 
of a certain type of conductive argumentation, namely, that includ-
ing counter-considerations or concessive speech-acts. 
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